Cybersecurity for wind and solar farms: What operators need to pay attention to now

The energy transition is unthinkable without digital technologies – but this is precisely where new risks lurk. Wind and solar farms, battery storage systems, and grid components are no longer just physical infrastructures, but highly interconnected systems that can be controlled, remotely maintained, and monitored via digital interfaces. While this makes operations more efficient, it also opens up new gateways for cyberattacks. With the draft of the NIS-2 Implementation and Cyber Security Strengthening Act (NIS2UmsuCG), politicians are therefore also placing greater responsibility on wind and solar farm operators.
Cybersecurity as a system issue
"Cybersecurity is national security," emphasizes Dennis Rendschmidt, Managing Director of the VDMA Power Systems Association. A successful attack not only damages individual systems, but can destabilize entire grid areas. The security of digital interfaces is therefore not just a technical chore, but a prerequisite for the energy transition to succeed without jeopardizing security of supply.
This isn't an abstract threat, but a systemic one: Even today, inverters in solar systems and control units in wind farms are directly connected to the grid. Manipulations can have a direct impact on grid stability. With increasing decentralization and the growing number of networked small systems, the attack surface is growing.
New regulatory guidelines
With the implementation of the European NIS-2 Directive, the German Federal Government intends to address precisely this issue. The planned NIS2UmsuCG (National Network Act) is intended not only to tighten operator obligations but also to give authorities such as the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) more far-reaching intervention options – up to and including bans on the use and operation of systems or components that pose security risks.
Key points from the industry perspective:
Protection against external access: Maintenance and updates by manufacturers remain essential, but must be clearly regulated and limited to a minimum of permissions. Any external access poses a potential risk of manipulation or espionage.
Single-operator principle: Operators are solely responsible for cybersecurity. However, if manufacturers or energy service providers have permanent remote access, the regulatory framework must define precisely how and under what conditions this is permitted.
Supply chain resilience: Critical components from unsafe third countries are considered a particular problem. Origin, update mechanisms, and support services will need to be subject to even greater scrutiny in the future.
Expansion of the KRITIS definition: Even smaller systems with grid relevance – such as solar inverters or decentralized storage systems – will in future be treated as critical infrastructure if their control allows external intervention.
Concrete need for action for operators
For wind farm and solar park operators, this translates into a long to-do list. Cybersecurity cannot be left solely to manufacturers – risks must also be actively managed during ongoing operations:
Precisely manage access rights. Every external connection—whether for inspections, firmware updates, or switching operations—must be documented, secured, and regularly reviewed. Operators should consistently ensure that no permanent "backdoors" exist in their systems.
Critically examine suppliers. Requirements go far beyond technical certifications. Operators must also consider geopolitical risks: If control components or digital services originate from countries potentially subject to state influence, dependency may arise in an emergency.
Professionalize Incident Response: Since not all risks can be eliminated, clear processes are needed for emergencies: Who will be notified? Which systems can be disconnected from the network? Operators who are prepared for this minimize downtime and consequential damage.
Implementing regulatory reporting and compliance: The NIS2UmsuCG (Security and Information Security Act) tightens reporting requirements for security incidents. Operators are well advised to adapt their internal processes to these requirements early on.
Energy transition needs cyber resilience
The industry itself is pushing for swift legal clarity. "The rapid adoption of the NIS2UmsuCG is imperative," states a recent position paper from the VDMA Power Systems. This is the only way to close regulatory gaps and create a uniform protective framework for all relevant energy technologies.
Operators of wind and solar farms are facing a paradigm shift. In addition to technical efficiency issues, they must increasingly consider organizational and regulatory requirements. This brings with it greater responsibility, but also the opportunity to establish cybersecurity as an integral part of a sustainable energy industry.
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